Justice
John Paul Stevens’ sarcastic and stinging dissent in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc. (1999) offers a practical lesson on the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
Brief background: The airline denied employment to twin sisters as airline
pilots because of severe myopia.
That sounds like a problem for a jet pilot …
until you read on that they worked without any problem as pilots for United’s commuter
airline. They wanted to fly bigger planes for more money.
For the
oddest of reasons, the pilots lost before the Supreme Court. The majority
opinion reasoned that because the pilots’ corrected vision was 20/20 with
glasses, they were not disabled and therefore could not proceed with a
disability lawsuit under the ADA.
The case
had major ramifications. If a person had medications that controlled diabetes,
they were no longer disabled and therefore could not sue for a reasonable
accommodation. Ditto for people with prosthetic devises that restored normal
function—they weren’t covered by the ADA. The list was nearly endless.
Justice
Stevens wrote this caustic dissent, employing several sight metaphors (see
black text in body of red text) to make his point clear:
“When it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or
Act), Congress certainly did not intend to require United Air Lines to hire
unsafe or unqualified pilots. Nor, in all likelihood, did it view every person
who wears glasses as [disabled]… Indeed, by reason of legislative myopia it may not
have foreseen that its definition of
“disability” might theoretically encompass, not just “some 43,000,000
Americans,” … but perhaps two or three times that number…. It is quite clear that the threshold question whether an individual is
“disabled” within the meaning of the Act—and, therefore, is entitled to the
basic assurances that the Act affords—focuses on
her past or present physical condition without regard to mitigation that has
resulted from rehabilitation, self-improvement, prosthetic devices, or
medication. One might reasonably argue that the general rule should not apply
to an impairment that merely requires a nearsighted person to wear glasses. But
I believe that, in order to be faithful to the remedial purpose of the Act, we
should give it a generous, rather than a miserly, construction.”
….
An example of a rather common condition illustrates this point:
There are many individuals who have lost one or more limbs in industrial
accidents, or perhaps in the service of their country in places like Iwo Jima.
With the aid of prostheses, coupled with courageous determination and physical
therapy, many of these hardy individuals can perform all of their major life
activities just as efficiently as an average couch potato. If the Act were just
concerned with their present ability to participate in society, many of these
individuals’ physical impairments would not be viewed as disabilities. Similarly, if the statute were solely
concerned with whether these individuals viewed
themselves as disabled—or with whether a majority of employers regarded them as
unable to perform most jobs—many of these individuals would lack statutory
protection from discrimination based on their prostheses.
The … statute’s three-pronged definition, however, makes it pellucidly clear that
Congress intended the Act to cover such persons. The fact that a prosthetic
device, such as an artificial leg, has restored one’s ability to perform major
life activities surely cannot mean that subsection (A) of the definition is
inapplicable. Nor should the fact that the individual considers himself (or
actually is) “cured,” or that a prospective employer considers him generally
employable, mean that subsections (B) or (C) are inapplicable.
…. In my view, when an employer refuses to hire the individual
“because of” his prosthesis, and the prosthesis in no way affects his ability
to do the job, that employer has unquestionably discriminated against the
individual in violation of the Act.
Farewell,
Justice Stevens. Thank you for your clear vision.
PS: Congress overturned the Court's decision in Sutton. He won, after all.
PS: Congress overturned the Court's decision in Sutton. He won, after all.
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