“Centipede in the Spoon” Case (1936): Lessons for Today

In Koplin v. Liggett, a grossed-out diner at a restaurant claimed she was “made sick by the presence of a centipede in the spoon with which she was eating vegetable soup served to her at lunch in defendant’s restaurant. On this account she brought suit to recover damages from defendant. In pursuance of binding instructions from the trial judge, the jury found a verdict” in favor of the restaurant.

Ms. Koplin appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

She explained to the Court:

“‘When I was taking a table spoon to my mouth I noticed a centipede in the spoon.’ She went on to say: ‘It was a sort of worm or centipede. That is what I thought it was.’ She added that she ‘didn’t touch it’ and did not put it in her mouth. She admitted that the soup, most of which she had eaten, had no bad taste. She claims that she was nauseated by seeing the object in the spoon and continued in this state for two or three weeks, although she was never actively sick in the sense that she vomited. During this period she was treated by her family physician five times. He testified that he gave her only simple remedies and that her disturbed state was more mental than physical. She claims to have lost nine or ten pounds in weight. Upon leaving the restaurant, she returned to the bank where she was employed and continued to work daily thereafter, losing no time whatever.”

The Court put aside the fact that there was no adequate proof that the centipede, or whatever it was, was in the soup when served to plaintiff.

Instead, the Court focused on the law— specifically, when is there a legal remedy when Person A unintentionally causes Person B to have extreme fright or anxiety.

“We are of opinion that a principle long established by us stands in the way of any recovery. ‘There can be no recovery for injuries resulting from fright, or a nervous shock, unaccompanied by physical injuries.’ In Ewing v. Pitt., Cinn. & St.L Ry. Co., we said: ‘It is plain from the plaintiff's statement of her case that her only injury proceeded from fright, alarm, fear, and nervous excitement and distress. There was no allegation that she had received any bodily injury. If mere fright, unaccompanied with bodily injury, is a cause of action, the scope of what are known as ‘accident cases’ will be very greatly enlarged; for in every case of a collision on a railroad the passengers, although they may have sustained no bodily harm, will have a cause of action against the company for the ‘fright’ to which they have been subjected.”

In many circumstances, and many states, this legal idea is largely true today. In one of our upcoming worker’s compensation cases, a factory worker is splattered with the blood of a co-worker who was lacerated on the job. She thought her co-worker was HIV-positive, and therefore, she fell into a deeply depressed state with extreme social anxiety. Her mental incapacities were real, even according to company doctors. But the Tennessee Supreme Court said that mental illness caused by fright, without an actual physical cause, is not compensable.